Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh[i]

Atif Pathan

Galgotias University

1.  BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

This case involved several appeals and writ petitions presented to the Apex Court. The subject concerned interpreting Article 21, the "Right to Life and Personal Liberty" in the CoI. As part of their case, the appellant argued that the constitutionally guaranteed "Right to Education" should also extend to professional education.

The petitioner primarily argued that, as the right to education already extends to elementary and secondary schools, it should also be extended to professional schools. The Supreme Court

rejected the request and dismissed the petition, which included “Justice M. Sharma C.J., R. Pandian, Mohan, P. Jeevan Reddy, and P. Bharucha.”. “Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka”[ii] established that all people had an inherent and unalienable right to an education, forming this case's basis. Although it is stated in Article 45, the subject of whether the "Right to Primary Education," as stated in Article 21, is a fundamental right is not addressed in the earlier case. Although the Supreme Court's decision in Mohini Jain’s case made it clear that capitation expenses cannot be charged, it ruled that the right to education is an inherent part of the right to life. This is because the right to education is necessary for guaranteeing individual respect and ensuring other fundamental rights, such as the right to free speech and expression and others under Article 19 of India's Constitution.

In this case, petitioners, who are private educational institutions, have challenged several state legislations. Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashtra passed legislation regulating fee charges to keep things running smoothly. Several schools in those states have protested and even gone to court over it.

2.  ARGUMENTS

·       Petitioner

The petitioners argued that regardless of a person's socioeconomic status, the state should provide them with access to quality education. Their case was strengthened by the fact that Mohini Jain had successfully expanded the scope of the right to education. The petitioners contended that the state did not have a monopoly in education. The committee concluded that it is within one's rights to construct a system of education that is self-sufficient, with the responsibility of collecting funds from applicants falling on the self-governance of the institution. They compiled their arguments about the supporting grounds.

No matter a person's family's income or social status, the state has a moral and legal responsibility to provide them with a quality education. Since providing education may also be seen as a commercial activity, the State does not exercise a monopoly in this area since this would go against the provisions of Article 19(1)(g). Interest, supply, and free play have all been affected by the State's exertion of power over market effects. Like the effort of putting in an endeavour, establishing an educational foundation is often done with an eye toward financial gain. The institution should have the autonomy to collect fees and student funds, and procedures like development, removal, and augmentation might vary from one institution to the next. Neither the institution's affiliation nor its perception of the public authority makes it a tool of the State[iii].

·       Respondents

The respondent submitted the affidavit to prove that the government was trying to implement Article 45. According to Article 45, which states that all children under the age of fourteen are required to attend a free and obligatory primary school, the provision of primary education is the exclusive prerogative of the State. In addition, a nation's monetary and social conditions determine the tremendous expense of higher education. Primary schools are becoming more mobile, so kids may ride their bikes or walk to school if they live nearby. Most people don't have to pay for tuition; they only have to pay for extras like books, bags, and uniforms.

The accompanying laws and regulations are now required in 14 states and territories that have passed related legislation. There was concern that if medical schools were to offer courses, it would lead to wasteful spending. Reportedly, 3.2% of the budget went for health and wellness initiatives, with clinical education receiving a proportional percentage. Priority was given to the health sector, which included addressing issues like medical clinic administrations and fundamental health developments.

Furthermore, quantifiable data on the expense of clinical education was supplied. Despite its lengthy history as a humanitarian cause and moral obligation, providing education cannot be considered a career in and of itself. Based on corruption, the public option is at odds with the actual idea of collecting school expenditures. No entity, including private education foundations, should be exempt from the state's mandate and regulations regarding the education of its citizens[iv].

3.  IMPACT OF THE CASE ON ARTICLE 21 AND RIGHT TO EDUCATION

·       Expansive Reach of Article 21: Safeguarding Fundamental Rights in India

A core essential fundamental right, Article 21, was given negative phrasing. It is unfair to say that the positive rights to life and freedom cannot be stated in Article 21 since it was coated with negative terminology. It serves as a protection against the difficulties of life or restrictions on personal freedom. While Article 19 focuses only on specific rights, Article 21 incorporates and covers a man's residual advantages.

Parts III and IV are not independent of one another but rather complementary; this allows for the transformation of any governmental plan into a resident's fundamental right. Included in Article 21 are numerous rights, including the following: the right to be free from solitary confinement and bar chains; the right to an attorney; the right to a fair trial; the right to be free from handcuffs; the right to be free from custodial brutality; the right to be free from public hanging; the right to health; the right to be free from environmental hazards; the right to have a protective shield; and the right to a steady case.

An exhaustive evaluation of the concepts guiding the State Policy was included. One contention was that the Constitution's DPSPs in Part IV are not enforceable, as stated in Article 37. This provision was deemed to be unconstitutional. Education for all children should be free and mandatory, but the "government effort" outlined in Article 45 cannot be enforced. These strategies fail because these ideals are guaranteed fundamental rights under India's Constitution (Article 21). Article 49 establishes a responsibility for the State, in contrast to Article 45's statement that the State should strive, which distinguishes the role of the State.

The positive interpretation of Article 21 was not given due consideration to the fact that great ideals like freedom are subject to change daily due to political, social, and economic advancements, which will call for the establishment of new rights and laws to address the expanding needs of the people. A static society must stay unaltered, something the framers of the Constitution often grasped. The Court found in the present case that the non-compliance with Article 14 was unacceptable.

The issue of whether education resounds with existence and articulates with meaning should be resolved by the Court; because of the high cost to the public coffers, access to higher education must be conditional on a person's financial and social standing. Therefore, higher education isn't simple or uncomplicated via relative mobility, but the State should try to provide elementary education and an opportunity to put it into practice. The federal government should facilitate intentional and private cooperation in the education medication market to drastically cut costs and expenses associated with specific standards and rules.

There must be action to prevent institutions with shallow education standards from becoming commonplace, for example, teaching in makeshift classrooms with little infrastructure with the express goal of generating money. They are also urged to get a technical degree to prove they follow their true calling. In this instance, the Hon'ble Bench saw them as buccaneers navigating the educational seas[v].

 Article 45 is the only article that sets a temporal limit for a person's right, and the bench has spoken its view and considered its safeguards. Finally, after 44 years, the Court looked into whether there had been any change in the criteria used to determine the insignificant time limit. The Court did rule that states should consider social and economic concerns before passing legislation, and it also noted that India cannot yet provide enough funding for education.

Ø  In the case of “T. M. A. Pai Foundation v. Territory of Karnataka”[vi], the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court ruled that colleges and state governments cannot control the affirmation policies of autonomous educational institutions run by linguistic and minority groups. Still, according to the Court, they can evaluate students' academic potential and establish guidelines for maintaining academic integrity. Recruiting instructors and other staff members are subject to comparable regulations.

Ø  According to the Court's ruling in “Islamic Academy v. State of Karnataka”[vii], while the State may set aside funds for quotas at certain educational institutions, it cannot set aside funds for tuition; instead, admissions should be made available via a standard, uniform examination of aptitude and performance.

Ø  The Court's decision in the Islamic Academy case, based on the well-known case of “P. Inamda v. State of Maharashtra”[viii], illustrates the effect that the State may have when it secures a certain quota for admissions to private academic institutions. The Court also ruled that the desire to increase one's capabilities is an inherent fundamental human right in the case of “Election Commission of India v. St. Mary's School”[ix].

·       Exhaustive evaluation of State Policy Concepts and Right to Education

Ø  While the right to education was not initially enshrined in India's Constitution as a fundamental right, its framers adopted it as a directive principle of state policy in Article 45, which mandated that the government must make every effort to ensure that all children in the country have access to free and compulsory education from the time the Constitution was ratified until they reached the age of fourteen. The State has, however, only sometimes sought to pass laws in line with Article 45.

Ø  The Court highlighted that although education is not specifically provided in the Constitution, it is a fundamental right that enables individuals to understand and enjoy other benefits of contemporary society. Only when the people of India are educated and conscious of their uniqueness will they fully understand and treasure the fundamental rights guaranteed by our Constitution, including the freedom to speak and write freely.

Ø  Article 21, which addresses the right to life and personal liberty, was requested by the esteemed Supreme Court of India to review the breadth and interpretation of the Constitution. One interpretation of Article 21 is the "right to live with human dignity." The right to exist is an abbreviation for all the other rights guaranteed as necessities for a decent existence.

Ø  Thus, according to Article 45, there is no room for interpretation of Article 21, which serves as the foundation for the human rights that are regularly enlarged. A fair and liberty-backed legislation presents a unique case for the Court to examine and uphold the right to life and liberty deprivation.

Ø  Following the guiding ideals is essential for understanding and integrating education into life. According to the Court, fundamental rights may be understood in a manner that aligns with the norms set by state order directives. The Directive Principles mandate these policies, an essential part of the social essence of the Constitution. These directives— enhanced and carried out by the Fundamental Rights—give the arrangement, the rules, and the conclusion of the financial incentive. Since the DPSP and fundamental rights do not seem at odds with one another, the harmonious structure should have no trouble being put into practice. Its FRs and DPSPs hold the Constitution's social spirit.

Ø  The goal of the Directive Principles is to produce a social insurgency that is both peaceful and guarantees the achievement of specific socioeconomic goals. For social, financial, and political equality to prevail, the State must secure its citizens' access to government aid while assuring their safety and meeting their social insurance requirements. Petitioners also requested that the State identify which schools are required to register.

Ø  The State's approval, which might be based on a preference for a specific technique or on conformity with the criteria of the Statute, is the only basis for such acknowledgment; no citizen has any significant right to register. Being so reliant on the State also rules it out as a constitutional right[x].

Ø  “Sections 22 and 23 of the University Grants Commission” forbid the issuance of degrees from any entity other than a university if someone is jealous of the institution's development. Unlike the special right granted to religious and etymological minorities to form educational foundations, which is compatible with providing protection and certainty to them in the general population, the freedom to establish an institution is granted under Article 19(1)(g). It hinges on Catholic values of tolerance and faith. Educational institutions are doing a public service by enforcing proper conduct on their pupils. Article 226 examines the idea of academic institutions' duty by stating that schools discharge public duties irrespective of whether organizations follow instructions.

4.  CONCLUSION

The Court noted that the Indian Constitution does not guarantee education as a basic right. With the guiding principles of state policy in Articles 38, 41, and 45, it is apparent that the Constituent Assembly amended this statute to guarantee that all Indians had access to excellent education. They want to improve India by educating more people. It was crucial to make education a basic right for everyone.

However, lawmakers required additional resources to execute this resolution. The Court decided that the right to education follows directly from the right to life since they are complementary basic rights.

This case serves as an excellent illustration of how the right to livelihood, and more especially the right to education, may be seen to include the right to life (or at least fundamental schooling). The Indian courts have been leading the way in expressly including the right to education into the right to life.

The State must offer educational institutions at all levels for its population within its legislative responsibility. A judicial method for determining a legislative provision's purpose is

interpretation. In “Unnikrishnan v. Union of India,” its major part is the right to education—a component of the right to life that was recognized as a constitutional right. Education is linked to other basic rights; consequently, the Indian government must establish educational institutions at all levels to serve the people.

REFERENCES

[i] 1993 AIR 2178.

[ii] 1992 SCC (3) 666.

[iii] V.N Shulka, Constitutional of India 84-96 (Eastern Book Company, 2008).

[iv] Ibid.

[v] Aashi Prakash, "Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh", 1(3) Jus Corpus Law Journal (JCLJ) 405-421 (2022).

[vi] AIR 2003 SC 355.

[vii] Writ Petition (civil) 350 of 1993.

[viii] (2005) 6 SCC 537.

[ix] 2007 AIR SCW 7761.

[x] Kopal Garg, "Right To Education in India as a Fundamental Right" 3 Asian Law & Public Policy Review 165-184 (2018).